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A tale of two cases: urging caution in 
the prosecution of HIV non-disclosure
Two provincial Courts of Appeal have recently released unanimous decisions that clarify 
the law regarding the obligation imposed upon people living with HIV to disclose their 
HIV status prior to sexual relations.  The decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
in R v. Mabior1 and of the Quebec Court of Appeal in R c. D.C.2 must be seen against 
a background of increasing criminal prosecutions in Canada of people with HIV who 
allegedly do not disclose their HIV status to sexual partners.  Since the first HIV non-
disclosure prosecution in 1989, there have been over 120 prosecutions.  A high pro-
portion of accused has either pleaded guilty to, or been convicted at trial, of serious 
criminal offences, often resulting in harsh sentences and sex offender registration.3  In 
the majority of convictions, there was no transmission of HIV to the complainant.4  
Despite the significant number of 
prosecutions, it is arguable that people 
living with HIV who know of their 
infection, of whom there were an 
estimated 48 100 in Canada in 2008,5 
cannot ascertain their criminal law 
disclosure obligation. The test set out 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R 
v. Cuerrier,6 requiring significant risk 
of serious bodily harm, has not pro-
vided adequate guidance to people liv-
ing with HIV, police, Crown counsel 
or lower courts. The Supreme Court 
will soon have an opportunity to 
revisit Cuerrier.  It has granted leave 
to appeal in Mabior and D.C.,7 which 
will be heard together.  In both cases, 
the Crown is arguing for a doctrine 
of informed consent in sexual assault 
such that non-disclosure accompa-
nied by any risk of HIV transmis-
sion, regardless of condom use or 
the amount of HIV in the infected 
person’s blood (known as viral load), 
would attract criminal liability.8  This 
comment begins with a review of each 
case, focusing on the analysis of the 
appellate courts, and then discusses 
three issues that the Supreme Court of 
Canada must confront when it hears 
the appeals.
The Mabior case
The accused was diagnosed as HIV-
positive in January 2004, and placed 
on antiretroviral therapy in April 
2004.  Between February 2004 and 
January 2006, the accused had sexual 
relations with nine female complain-
ants, several of them teenagers, 
sometimes with condoms and some-
times without, and often the relations 
involved use of alcohol and illicit 
drugs supplied by the accused.  There 
was evidence that he had not been 
using condoms properly during this 
time, because he was infected twice 
with gonorrhoea and was listed as a 
contact for chlamydia.  To date, none 
of the complainants has tested posi-
tive for HIV. 
At trial, the accused was convicted 
of six counts of aggravated sexual 
assault and one count each of invita-
tion to sexual touching and sexual 
interference, and was sentenced to a 
total of 14 years’ incarceration.9  The 
trial judge found that five of these 
six complainants would not have had 
sex with Mabior if they had known 
of his HIV-positive status.  The sixth, 
who was 14 years of age, learned of 
his status during the course of their 
sexual relationship.  The trial judge 
stated several times in her reasons 
that condom usage only resulted in 
an 80 percent reduction of the risk of 
transmission of HIV, but she did not 
clearly apply this level of risk reduc-
tion to the already low rates of sexual 
transmission.  In essence, she found 
that any risk of transmission was 
sufficient to meet the Cuerrier test — 
only when use of a condom and an 
undetectable viral load are both pres-
ent would the risk be reduced suf-
ficiently to negate the significant risk 
of serious bodily harm.  
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, in 
a cautious and well-reasoned judg-
ment, attempted to put some limits on 
the criminalization of non-disclosure.  
The Court sought to achieve a bal-
ance between competing interests:
In this context, no one, including the 
intervener, the Canadian HIV/AIDS 
Legal Network, disagrees with charg-
ing individuals who intentionally or 
recklessly infect their partners with a 
serious disease.  The criminal law has 
a role to play in protecting the public 
from irresponsible individuals.  Nor is 
there any disagreement that, from an 
ethical and public health perspective, 
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disclosure is necessary.  However, 
between those two poles, policy con-
siderations should impact on the law 
so as to produce a more nuanced view 
of when failure to disclose warrants 
criminal sanctions.  There are other 
mechanisms for the state to inter-
vene, short of criminalizing the act.  
Criminal sanctions should be reserved 
for those deliberate, irresponsible 
or reckless individuals who do not 
respond to public health directives and 
who are truly blameworthy.10
The Court held that the trial judge 
made two errors.  First, even though 
the test requires that there be a sig-
nificant risk, the trial judge required 
that, to avoid conviction, there must 
be virtually no risk of harm, requir-
ing both the use of condoms and an 
undetectable viral load.  Instead, the 
Court held that, if either of these fac-
tors was present, HIV non-disclosure 
was not subject to criminal liability 
because the risk would be reduced 
below what is considered significant. 
Second, the Court held that the tri-
al judge had erred in her focus on the 
finding that condoms reduce the risk 
of sexual transmission by 80 percent.  
The Court clarified that 80 percent 
relates to an 80 percent reduction of 
an already low rate of sexual trans-
mission.  The risk of transmission the 
trial judge should have considered 
was 20 percent of “an already small 
baseline figure.”11 The Court found 
that “consistent and careful use of 
condoms”12 or “reasonably proper 
condom use”13 reduces the risk below 
significance.  The Court explicitly 
rejected the Crown’s argument that, 
because the potential harm involved 
was so serious, virtually any pos-
sibility of that harm occurring was 
significant.  
The Court elaborated on the care-
ful use of condoms by listing 10 fac-
tors provided by an expert witness 
that would represent “an ideal situa-
tion.”14  In addition, the Court made 
clear that, when a condom breaks, the 
accused must immediately disclose 
his or her HIV status to a non-HIV-
positive partner so that the partner 
may seek prophylactic measures.  
Non-disclosure in this context would 
be equated with unprotected sex.15
The Court noted the significance 
of the scientific developments post-
Cuerrier, including the successful 
use of antiretroviral therapy, which 
can dramatically reduce viral load 
and subsequent risk of transmission.  
The Court held that the application 
of Cuerrier must “evolve to account 
appropriately for the development 
of the science of HIV treatment.”16  
However, the Court was not willing 
to make definitive statements on viral 
load and instead held that each case 
will depend on the evidence present-
ed, while also urging the Supreme 
Court of Canada to provide more 
guidance.17  On the facts, the Court 
of Appeal found that the standard 
of “significant risk of serious bodily 
harm” was met with respect to only 
two of the accused’s six aggravated 
sexual assault convictions. 
The D.C. case
In the summer of 2000, D.C. met a 
man at a soccer pitch, where each 
had a son playing soccer.  Thus 
began a four-year relationship.  
The trial judge found one incident 
of unprotected sexual intercourse 
prior to HIV disclosure, which took 
place early in the relationship.  The 
relationship came to a tumultuous 
end in November 2004 when D.C. 
called police alleging that her partner 
had physically assaulted her and her 
son.  Her partner was charged with, 
and convicted at trial of, assault.  
In February 2005, he contacted 
the police and complained of the 
one earlier incident of unprotected 
intercourse prior to HIV disclosure.  
D.C. was charged with one count 
each of aggravated assault and sexual 
assault.
At trial, expert medical testimony 
established that the risk of HIV 
transmission during unprotected 
sexual intercourse between an HIV-
infected female and a male is 1 in 
1000, irrespective of HIV viral load.18 
Where the female’s HIV viral load is 
“undetectable” (below 50 copies of 
HIV per millilitre of blood), the risk 
of transmission is 1 in 10 000, which 
risk decreases to 1 in 50 000 where  
a condom is used.  Citing Cuerrier 
and Williams,19 the trial judge found 
D.C. guilty of aggravated assault 
because her failure to disclose her 
HIV status prior to unprotected 
sexual intercourse exposed her 
partner to a significant risk of serious 
bodily harm.  The trial judge also 
found D.C. guilty of sexual assault, 
since her partner’s consent to sex  
had been vitiated by the HIV  
non-disclosure. 
People living with HIV 
who know of their 
infection cannot ascertain 
with certainty their 
criminal law disclosure 
obligation.
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D.C. appealed her convictions to 
the Quebec Court of Appeal.  She 
argued that the trial judgment rep-
resented an unwarranted and overly 
expansive interpretation of the crimi-
nal obligations placed upon HIV-
positive people, and erred in rejecting 
the uncontradicted expert evidence 
of the extremely minimal risk of HIV 
transmission in the circumstances of 
the case, thereby ignoring the sig-
nificant risk standard established in 
Cuerrier.  The Crown argued that the 
failure by an HIV-positive person to 
disclose his or her HIV status prior 
to unprotected sexual intercourse car-
ried sufficient risk to vitiate his or her 
partner’s consent to intercourse.  
A unanimous Court of Appeal 
addressed the “heart of the appeal”:20 
the relationship between the disclo-
sure obligation, the significance of 
the risk of bodily harm and the medi-
cal evidence. The Court reviewed the 
essential elements of fraud in sexual 
relations — dishonesty and the risk 
of deprivation — established by the 
Supreme Court in Cuerrier.  Its anal-
ysis highlighted those parts of Justice 
Cory’s judgment that tie the HIV 
disclosure obligation to the risk posed 
to the sexual partner’s health: the dis-
closure obligation increases with the 
risk associated with the sexual act.21  
The Court found that the trial judge 
had erred in the application of the test 
to the evidence.  There was uncon-
tradicted evidence that the accused 
had an undetectable viral load.  The 
Court reviewed the expert testimony 
and found that, as a result of effec-
tive medications, D.C.’s HIV viral 
load became undetectable at the end 
of June 2000 and stayed undetect-
able until spring of 2001.  The Court 
found that, in the circumstances of 
the case, the risk of transmission was 
so small as not to constitute a “sig-
nificant risk of serious bodily harm,” 
such that D.C.’s failure to disclose 
her HIV status to the complainant did 
not vitiate his consent to unprotected 
sexual intercourse as required under 
Cuerrier.22  In the Court’s view, the 
terms used by the medical experts 
(“very weak,” “very minimal” and 
“very, very low”) were incompatible 
with the existence of any significant 
risk whatsoever.23  Thus, the trial 
judge had erred in finding that the 
Crown had proven the offences of 
sexual assault and aggravated assault. 
The Court quotes favourably from 
Justice Steel’s reasons in Mabior, 
including the invitation to the 
Supreme Court to revisit and clarify 
the inherent uncertainty in the sig-
nificant risk test.24  In conclusion, the 
Court suggests that the question of 
the use of the criminal law to address 
the transmission of serious com-
municable infections might be one 
most appropriately left to Parliament, 
given the issue’s numerous social, 
ethical and moral ramifications.25
 Analysis and comment
These cases could not be more differ-
ent on their facts and demonstrate the 
wide range of complex and diverse 
circumstances that lead to HIV non-
disclosure prosecutions.  What these 
cases share, however, is that the trial 
judges held that any risk of transmis-
sion of HIV was sufficient to satisfy 
the “significant risk of serious bodily 
harm” test from Cuerrier.  Both 
appeal courts disagreed, holding that 
the requirement from Cuerrier that 
the risk be significant must be given 
some meaning and that not all risks 
will vitiate consent to sex.  These 
cases provide the opportunity for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to examine 
how our increased knowledge of HIV 
transmission risk, and our ability to 
greatly reduce that already low risk 
through condoms and antiretroviral 
medication, should affect a legal test 
developed at a time when HIV almost 
always led to AIDS and death.  We 
discuss three issues that merit consid-
eration by the Supreme Court. 
The significant risk test: an 
evidence-informed approach
The Supreme Court will soon have 
the opportunity to clarify the sig-
nificant risk of serious bodily harm 
test.  If the Supreme Court follows 
its Cuerrier analysis, the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning in Mabior is an 
excellent, evidence-informed start-
ing point.  The latter Court provides 
overall guidance as to the appropriate 
function of the criminal law in the 
context of HIV non-disclosure, fun-
damentally distinguishing between 
what the majority of people would 
consider moral or ethical sexual  
conduct, and conduct that should  
be subject to criminal sanction:  
“[e]veryone would want to be told 
that a potential partner was HIV-
positive.  Most people would agree 
that there was a moral and ethical 
obligation to disclose that informa-
tion.”26  Yet the Court explicitly 
The requirement from 
Cuerrier that the risk be 
significant must be given 
some meaning — not all 
risks will vitiate consent 
to sex.
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recognized that criminal sanctions 
should only be imposed where the 
risk of bodily harm resulting from the 
non-disclosure is significant.27
The Court articulated the follow-
ing principles for determining wheth-
er the sexual act put the complainant 
at a “significant risk of serious bodily 
harm”: (i) at present, being infected 
with HIV subjects an individual to 
serious bodily harm;28 (ii) the Crown 
will bear the burden of proving that 
there was a significant risk of HIV 
transmission given the HIV viral 
load of the accused at the relevant 
time(s);29 (iii) the determination of 
risk should be consistent with medi-
cal science related to HIV/AIDS, 
which will develop over time;30 (iv) 
the risk of sexual transmission  is 
cumulative, increasing with each risk-
presenting act; (v) reasonably proper 
condom use, as opposed to perfect 
condom use, reduces the risk of sex-
ual transmission to below the level 
of significance;31 and (vi) where a 
condom breaks, immediate disclosure 
by the HIV-positive partner could 
suffice to reduce the risk of harm.32  
Non-disclosure after a condom breaks 
is only criminalized where there is a 
detectable viral load.
Significantly, the Court recognizes 
the significant legal relevance of con-
doms in determining HIV transmis-
sion risk and the criminal law duty 
of disclosure.  The Court accepts that 
even reasonably proper condom use, 
as opposed to perfect condom use, 
for sexual intercourse reduces the 
risk of HIV transmission to below the 
level of significance.33  This position 
is consistent with the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Cuerrier 
and encourages mutually responsible 
sexual behaviour that will ultimately 
reduce the risk of HIV transmission 
more than disclosure.
By contrast, the Court’s equivo-
cal approach to the impact of HIV 
viral load on the risk of transmission 
represents a missed opportunity to 
clarify the law further:  
It is true that the test for a viral load 
is done for “a moment in time.” … 
Common infections, STDs and treat-
ment issues can lead to fluctuations 
in a person’s viral load. HIV-positive 
people with apparently undetectable 
viral loads can experience occasional 
spikes in viral load or may develop 
viral resistance.  Consequently, no 
comprehensive statement can be made 
about the impact of low viral loads 
on the question of risk.  Each case 
will depend on the facts regarding the 
particular accused, and each case will 
depend on the state of the medical 
evidence at the time and the manner in 
which it is presented in that particular 
case.34 [Emphasis added.] 
This approach is unfortunate given 
the large body of recent scientific 
literature suggesting that effective 
antiretroviral therapy offers more sig-
nificant protection against HIV trans-
mission during sex than does condom 
use.35  It also stands in contrast to the 
Court’s findings on the facts of the 
case.  It posed the following ques-
tion in relation to each complainant 
where it found that a condom was not 
properly used: “[w]as the accused’s 
viral load undetectable at the time of 
sexual intercourse?”  If so, there was 
no significant risk of HIV transmis-
sion, no duty to disclose on the part 
of Mabior and no criminalization of 
non-disclosure.
One issue that must be addressed 
in the context of viral load is burden 
of proof.  We suggest that the burden 
be on the Crown to prove all elements 
of the assault offence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, which includes lead-
ing evidence to establish that, in the 
circumstances of the case, the sexual 
act presented a significant risk of seri-
ous bodily harm to the complainant.  
This approach is preferable to the 
one set out by the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal in Wright,36 whereby 
the Crown can establish a significant 
risk based on average risk as set 
out in the literature.  The approach 
from Wright is based on the heavily 
stigmatizing presumption that sexual 
intercourse with a person living with 
HIV per se presents a significant risk 
of HIV transmission, which reflects 
an outdated, inaccurate view of HIV.  
Moreover, the courts of appeal in 
Mabior and D.C. soundly reject this 
presumption in favour of a case-
specific, expert-informed assessment 
of risk, which takes into account the 
factors that decrease and increase 
transmission risk.  Such an approach 
avoids placing on the accused the 
tactical burden of proof to introduce 
case-specific evidence regarding HIV 
transmission risk in response to the 
general evidence of risk introduced 
by the Crown.  It properly places the 
initial tactical decision on the Crown 
whether to introduce medical and 
scientific evidence of HIV transmis-
sion risk in the circumstances of the 
case, readily obtained by the Crown 
through search warrant, subpoena and 
expert testimony.
Is aggravated (sexual) assault 
the appropriate offence?  
Currently, prosecutions for non-
disclosure to one’s sexual partner 
involve almost exclusively charges 
of aggravated assault or aggravated 
sexual assault.37  The latter is the 
most serious sexual offence in the 
Criminal Code and is punishable by 
a maximum life sentence.  These 
offences are used whether or not HIV 
is transmitted.  In fact, prosecution 
U R G I N G  C A U T I O N  I N  T H E  P R O S E C U T I O N  O F  H I V  N O N - D I S C L O S U R E
VOLUME 15, NUMBER 3, OCTOBER 2011 19
will be easier where the virus is not 
transmitted because where the com-
plainant is HIV-positive the Crown 
will need to prove that she was not 
infected with HIV at the time of 
sexual relations with the accused.38  
We argue that both aggravated sexual 
assault and aggravated assault result 
in over-criminalization where the 
virus is not transmitted to the com-
plainant, and such serious offences 
should be limited to cases where HIV 
was transmitted with the result that 
the complainant’s life was actually 
endangered as opposed to the poten-
tial risk of endangerment.39  
What makes an assault or sexual 
assault “aggravated” is the additional 
harm caused to the complainant 
through wounding, maiming, dis-
figuring or endangering life.40  We 
would argue that, where the virus 
is not transmitted, life has not been 
endangered.  As mentioned earlier, 
the presumption that sex with an 
HIV-positive person is always life-
endangering is not accurate.  Where 
the virus is not transmitted, the fact 
that it could have been is not suf-
ficient to warrant the degree of 
criminal responsibility attached to 
an aggravated (sexual) assault con-
viction.  New Zealand and several 
Australian jurisdictions rely on dif-
ferent offences based on whether the 
virus was transmitted.41 
This raises the question of what 
offence is most appropriate where 
transmission has not taken place 
despite the fact that the complainant 
has been exposed to a significant risk 
of acquiring HIV.  We would argue 
that, at most, the lesser included 
offences of assault or sexual assault 
be employed where the virus has not 
been transmitted.  This would be most 
consistent with treating transmission 
cases as aggravated (sexual) assault 
and the idea that non-disclosure, in 
the context of a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm, vitiates consent 
to the touching involved.  However, 
assault-based offences leave courts in 
the conundrum of applying probabili-
ties in individual cases to determine 
whether the risk of an event that did 
not happen was significant. 
We suggest that the Supreme 
Court has a more radical option 
open to it, that is, to reject the 
assault-based analysis of Cuerrier 
as unworkable and to shift the focus 
to the harm caused by transmission.  
The Court could re-think the question 
of whether failure to disclose actually 
vitiates consent to sexual activity.  
What kind of deceptions constitute 
fraud?  On the one hand, one could 
take a very broad approach such as 
was done by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
in Cuerrier, whereby any deception 
that induces consent constitutes fraud 
and vitiates consent.  Under such an 
approach, if a man told a woman he 
was single when in fact he was mar-
ried and his assertion induced con-
sent, his lie would constitute fraud 
vitiating consent.  A broad approach 
might be desirable in sexual assault 
generally to protect women from 
sexual violence and coercion.  
On the other hand, one could 
apply a narrower approach that only 
limits consent in cases where the 
fraud goes to precisely what the com-
plainant consented to.  For example, 
in R v. Crangle,42 the accused was 
the identical twin brother of the com-
plainant’s boyfriend.  When he start-
ed having sex with her, she thought 
she was having sex with her boy-
friend.  This deception went to the 
very essence of the sexual activity — 
she consented to have sex with A and 
not to have sex with B.  The kind of 
deception involved in non-disclosure 
is subtly different from most of the 
other fraud cases that arise.  In the 
HIV non-disclosure cases, the com-
plainant wanted the sexual activity to 
take place with the accused, but not 
necessarily with a person who was 
HIV-positive.  The assumption is that 
if the accused is HIV-positive, he or 
she will disclose and sex will either 
not take place or protective measures 
will be taken.  
We would argue, however, that 
one can never presume one is hav-
ing sex with a person who is HIV-
negative.  HIV is most transmissible 
when one’s viral load is highest, such 
as during the early stages of infec-
tion, often before the person knows 
they are HIV-positive43 — and an 
alarmingly high proportion of per-
sons with HIV do not know their sta-
tus.44  Nor can one make reasonable 
assessments about who is likely to be 
HIV-positive based on assumptions 
about who gets HIV and who does 
not.  Thus, while the suggestion that 
everyone needs to protect themselves 
appears trite, it remains the best way 
to prevent transmission of the virus.  
Where the virus is not 
transmitted, the fact that 
it could have been is 
not sufficient to warrant 
the degree of criminal 
responsibility attached 
to an aggravated (sexual) 
assault conviction.
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We do recognize that some people 
are not in a position to insist on con-
dom use or to understand the risks 
involved in sexual activity generally.  
In this latter category, it may be pos-
sible to argue that someone who does 
not understand the risks involved 
in sexual activity is not capable of 
giving meaningful consent to sex.45  
With respect to someone who cannot 
safely insist on condom use to protect 
herself, we question the voluntariness 
of consent in this context.46 
If the Court were to reject the 
fraud-based approach as unworkable, 
criminal negligence causing bodily 
harm would be a possible charge 
in cases of HIV transmission.  The 
mens rea is well-suited to the HIV 
non-disclosure cases where, in the 
vast majority of cases, the accused 
does not intend to transmit the virus 
and rather hopes that no transmis-
sion takes place.47  In such a case, 
criminal negligence, which speaks of 
wanton or reckless disregard for the 
safety of others, seems well-suited 
to the risk-taking nature of the activ-
ity.  This offence would only apply 
where the virus has been transmitted 
because Canadian criminal law does 
not punish criminal negligence in 
and of itself without proof of bodily 
harm or death.  This offence would 
take the focus off the sexual nature of 
the harm and shift it to the deliberate 
risk-taking activity on the part of the 
accused.  The more difficult question 
is what offence might be appropri-
ate where the virus is not transmit-
ted.  In our view, such cases should 
only be prosecuted where there is a 
pattern of non-disclosure in the con-
text of unprotected sex.  Common 
nuisance is one option that could be 
applied, an offence that criminal-
izes the endangering of “lives, safety 
or health of the public” through an 
unlawful act or failure to discharge 
a duty.48  This offence is not without 
its problems and courts would still 
have to draw limits about what level 
of risk is sufficient to constitute that 
endangerment to the public.49  
We are not suggesting we can 
resolve this difficult issue in a case 
comment.  Rather, we seek merely 
to raise the possibility that the sex-
ual assault approach is not the only 
approach to this issue.  What is clear 
from examining various Criminal 
Code provisions is that none of the 
offences in the current Criminal Code 
were designed to cover the non-
disclosure of a sexually transmitted 
infection.  The Criminal Code used 
to have a specific provision, enacted 
in 1919,50 making it an offence, 
punishable on summary conviction, 
to communicate a venereal disease, 
knowingly or by culpable negligence, 
to another person.  This provision 
was, somewhat ironically, repealed in 
1985, just a few years before the first 
HIV non-disclosure prosecution in 
Canada.  In 1984, the federal Badgely 
Committee had recommended, 
instead of the provision, strengthen-
ing provincial health regulations, 
more effective diagnostic criteria, 
research and public education.51  In 
1985, the Fraser Committee con-
cluded again that the provision was 
“hopelessly outdated in the etiologi-
cal assumptions it makes” and “clear-
ly does not reflect modern knowledge 
on, or practice in relation to, sexu-
ally transmitted diseases.”52  We are 
concerned that HIV has been singled 
out for special treatment when other 
sexually transmitted infections may 
be even more easily transmissible. 
Why are HIV prosecutions increasing 
in frequency and severity at the same 
time that our ability to clinically 
manage HIV, and to prevent transmis-
sion through antiretroviral medica-
tion, has improved so dramatically?  
Whatever crime(s) the Supreme 
Court of Canada decides should 
apply in this context, it is impera-
tive that provincial and territorial 
Attorneys General seriously consider 
developing comprehensive prosecu-
torial guidelines, as has been done 
in England and Wales.53  Given the 
dangers of over-criminalizing non-
disclosure — such as discouraging 
HIV testing, driving people living 
with HIV away from health care and 
social services out of fears of crimi-
nal prosecution — and the dangers of 
further marginalizing people living 
with HIV, guidelines should strive 
to limit prosecutions to those cases 
where the blunt force of the criminal 
law is absolutely necessary to deter 
or incapacitate the individual. 
The need for caution in  
the unique context of non-
disclosure prosecutions
Our final point is that the political 
and social dynamics of HIV non-
disclosure prosecutions mitigate in 
favour of caution.  The Crown, in the 
documents filed with the Supreme 
It is imperative that 
provincial and territorial 
Attorneys General 
seriously consider 
developing comprehensive 
prosecutorial guidelines.
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Court in Mabior and D.C., argues 
that R v. Ewanchuk54 be used to 
modify the rule in Cuerrier so as to 
require fully informed consent, the 
absence of which would render any 
non-disclosures an aggravated sexual 
assault.  
The Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Ewanchuk was an impor-
tant victory for women in the context 
of sexual assault, reaffirming the 
importance of consent being assessed 
from the perspective of the complain-
ant and the importance of autonomy 
in sexual decision-making.  We 
are concerned that an expansion of 
Ewanchuk in the HIV context ignores 
the unique context of HIV non-dis-
closure prosecutions and the stigma 
and prejudice resulting from over-
criminalization of persons living with 
HIV.  The criminal law must be used 
with particular caution where it is 
being applied only against members 
of a marginalized group and we must 
ask whether other mechanisms, such 
as public health legislation, are better 
suited for dealing with this complex 
social problem.  We urge the courts 
to deal with non-disclosure cases as a 
unique context and not as an oppor-
tunity to expand the crime of sexual 
assault generally. 
As the Supreme Court of Canada 
has recognized, sexual assault gen-
erally is a highly gendered crime.  
Over 97 percent of those accused of 
sexual assault are men,55 and roughly 
85 percent of all complainants are 
women.56  Certain groups of women 
are at a higher risk of sexual assault, 
such as women involved in prostitu-
tion,57 women with disabilities58 and 
Aboriginal women.59  Conviction 
rates for sexual assault generally are 
also very low in part due to the fact 
that women’s allegations of sexual 
violence are often disbelieved.60 
The gendered nature of non-
disclosure prosecutions is less clear 
and something we are only beginning 
to understand.  Overwhelmingly, 
in Canada,61 the accused in non-
disclosure cases are men.  A recent 
study found that 91 percent of those 
charged in Canada for failing to 
disclose their HIV status are men.62  
Overall, 65 percent of all Canadians 
charged are men who fail to disclose 
their status to women, although we 
may be seeing an increase in the 
number of charges against men who 
have sex with men.63  However, this 
does not appear to be an accurate 
reflection of non-disclosure rates in 
the community.  There is some evi-
dence that men withhold their HIV 
status more often than do women, but 
this evidence is far from unambigu-
ous and does not explain the prepon-
derance of female complainants:
Variations in disclosure based on race, 
gender and age yield controversial 
findings. White and Hispanic indi-
viduals have been found to be more 
likely to disclose to partners than 
African-Americans, yet other research 
suggests that race and ethnicity do not 
play a role.  Although Stein and col-
leagues found that women are more 
likely to disclose than men, most 
existing research suggests that gender 
is not associated with partner disclo-
sure.  Younger age has also been asso-
ciated with higher disclosure.  Other 
researchers, however, have document-
ed a relationship between youth and 
non-disclosure.64
We would argue that the prosecutions 
for non-disclosure in the HIV context 
are disproportionately for non-dis-
closure in the heterosexual context.  
This may say more about the value 
we put on potential complainants 
of non-disclosure than the potential 
accused.  Police and prosecutors may 
be more likely to see women as vic-
tims of sexual assault (as compared 
to gay men).  Similarly, there may 
be a different ethic in the gay com-
munity around laying complaints for 
non-disclosure because of attitudes 
towards police and the criminal jus-
tice system, or because there may 
be a higher level of acceptance of  
mutual responsibility for preventing 
HIV transmission in the gay commu-
nity.  Conviction rates in the non-dis-
closure context are much higher than 
in sexual assault generally,65 perhaps 
because persons with HIV are even 
less likely to be believed than sexual 
assault complainants and guilty pleas 
are common, possibly due to the pub-
licity and resultant stigma associated 
with these trials.
The impact of over criminaliza-
tion of non-disclosure of HIV status 
has implications for women both as 
potential complainants and as poten-
tial accused.66  The cases to date 
highlight women as HIV-negative 
complainants who face the poten-
tial of acquiring the virus from their 
The criminalization of non-
disclosure may make non-
disclosure more likely, as 
persons with HIV may fear 
the consequences of their 
status becoming known 
to previous or current 
partners.
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non-disclosing partners.  But issues 
of non-disclosure also arise for HIV-
positive women.  D.C. demonstrates 
the complexity of this issue: charges 
were not laid against D.C. until over 
four years after the complainant 
learned of the non-disclosure and only 
after D.C. laid charges of domestic 
assault.  Women in relationships of 
heightened inequality, such as women 
in abusive relationships or women 
with disabilities, may have particu-
lar barriers to disclosing their status 
to sexual partners or in insisting on 
condom use.  There is also the alarm-
ing potential for charging women for 
passing on the virus to their children 
during childbirth or breastfeeding.67
Perhaps the biggest difference 
between the non-disclosure context 
and other sexual assault offences 
is that every accused person in the 
non-disclosure context is grappling 
with HIV and thus is a member of a 
highly stigmatized group in Canadian 
society.  The charges in question 
relate directly to their status as HIV-
positive individuals.  They may have 
acquired the virus through the non-
disclosure of their partners or through 
some other means.  Regardless, 
they are likely to have experienced 
discrimination and rejection when 
others have learned of their HIV 
status.  Many will have experienced 
the loss of a job, the loss of friends 
and the loss of a partner on dis-
closing their HIV-positive status.68  
Over-criminalization of persons 
with HIV runs the risk of further 
marginalization and stigmatization.  
Marginalization contributes to non-
disclosure; it does not prevent it.  The 
more negative the social consequenc-
es of disclosure, the less likely it is 
to take place.  Until we give people 
the necessary physical, economic 
and social supports to enable them to 
disclose their status safely, non-dis-
closure is likely to continue at a high 
rate.  In fact, the criminalization of 
non-disclosure may make non-disclo-
sure more likely, as persons with HIV 
may fear the consequences of their 
status becoming known to previous 
or current partners.  
Conclusion
At a minimum, with the upcoming 
appeals the Supreme Court should 
address the need for clarity among 
the range of people affected by the 
criminal law related to HIV non-
disclosure: people living with  
HIV/AIDS, police, Crown counsel 
and the judiciary.  These people need 
to know whether there is a duty to 
disclose prior to oral sex, prior to 
protected sexual intercourse, or prior 
to unprotected sexual intercourse 
where an HIV-positive person has an 
undetectable viral load.  The appeals 
will also present the Supreme Court 
with the opportunity to further refine 
the criminalization of HIV non-
disclosure in ways that will preserve 
the integrity of sexual assault law by 
restricting the circumstances in which 
HIV non-disclosure calls for crimi-
nal prosecution and identifying the 
Criminal Code offences most appro-
priate to those circumstances.  
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